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Abstract
We consider per-capita carbon dioxide emission trends in 16 early developed coun-
tries over the period 1870-2028. Using a multiple-break time series method we find
more evidence for very early downturns in per-capita trends than for late downturns,
during the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Only for two countries do downturns in trends
imply downward sloping stable trends. We also consider trends in emission composition
and find little evidence for in-sample peaks for emissions from liquid and gaseous fuel
uses. These results lead us to reject the oil price shocks as events causing permanent
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breaks in the structure and level of emissions, a conclusion often made in analyses using
shorter postwar data.
1 Introduction
While consequences of the climate warming remain highly uncertain, most scientists find
it likely that emissions of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases contribute
to the warming. The rising atmospheric concentration of CO2 is generally viewed as the
most important cause for the greenhouse eﬀect. Economic actions that seek to reverse the
”business-as-usual” trend of CO2 emissions may prove to be very costly: according to an
overview of estimates produced by thirteen research teams, the implementation of relatively
modest reduction targets may generate significant annual costs ([28]; see also [17]).
Because of these characteristics, there has been a considerable recent interest in projecting
the development of global CO2 emissions to the future. The econometric approach has
been to model similarities across countries using reduced-form models estimated with cross-
national panel data on CO2 emissions and indicators of economic development ([25], [24],
[11], [10] [23]). The global projections are then based on the assumption that development in
developing countries brings about the emission pattern estimated for the developed countries.
Much of the focus has been on a pattern called ”inverted U” relationship between emissions
and income levels. The relationship is interesting because it implies that future reduction in
emissions might follow as a by-product of economic growth.
This paper is not about the ”inverted U”. Rather than testing hypotheses about global
similarities in emission-income patterns, we choose a much simpler objective: What are the
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historical trends in per-capita emissions from fossil fuel burning for those countries which
have the longest industrial history? To put this question to perspective we note that per-
capita emissions from solid-fuel burning, while still significant, are currently below the levels
reached close to 100 years ago in many early developed countries. The (nontrivial) national
emission histories are thus much longer than the postwar period used in previous studies
focusing on the ”inverted U”.1 In fact, for most developed countries the national time series
of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion can be extended to the early stages of industrial
revolution. Using such data over the period 1870− 1998 for 16 early developed countries we
address the phases of per-capita emission development by identifying stable historical trends
and structural breaks in trends with time-series methods.
One hypothesis is that early industrialized countries have had three phases in their emis-
sion development. The first phase was that of fast growth of per-capita emissions, as early
industrialization and development in general was so heavily using coal. The second phase
was characterized by less growth due to the shift from solid to non-solid fuels (from coal to
oil and gas). This diversification in national fuel compositions was partly induced by local
but CO2-related pollution problems and technological progress associated with the demand
for higher energy density fuels.2 The third phase followed the oil price shocks of the 1970s
1These studies consider reduced-form relationships with a wide country coverage, so that it would be hard
to extend the data period beyond the postwar era without loosing the country coverage or quality of the
data for economic variables. We focus on a subset of countries having a reasonably good statistical basis for
the pre-1950 period for the variables we use, so that it makes sense to consider the longer period 1870-1998.
Edmunds and Reilly [22] also have a similar historical perspective but a shorter post-energy crises period.
2The shift from solid to liquid fuels is an example of the trend toward ”Decarbonization”, claimed to have
been ongoing for the last 200 years [2]. For example, burning wood releases about 10 carbons per hydrogen
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which permanently changed the structure of emissions from fossil fuels and possibly led to
downward sloping per-capita emission trends.
We find evidence for very early downturns in stable per-capita trends, during the first
decade of 20th century, for a group of industrial first movers. This is consistent with the
above hypothesis. However, we find relatively little evidence for late downturns, during the
oil price shocks of the 1970s, which contradicts the above three-phase pattern. Only for
two countries do downturns in trends imply downward sloping stable trends. To understand
what causes the early downturns in trends we consider trends in emissions from two sources:
from (i) solid and (ii) liquid and gaseous (non-solid) fuels burning. Changes in emission
composition indicate shifts in national fuel composition. In fact, this shift is related to the
early downturns, since all stable trends for emissions from solid-fuels burning have very early
structural breaks and trends in several countries have been downward sloping for a period
close to century long. The emission composition also indicates why the oil price shocks of
the 1970s cannot be viewed as events causing general downturns in per-capita emissions:
there are signs of temporary substitution away from liquid to solid fuels during the 1970s,
so that the overall emission levels do not experience large shocks causing general downturns
in long-run trends.3
atom. This ratio is: one- or two-to-one for coal; one-to-two for oil; and one-to-four for natural gas [2]. So,
the trend implies that the use of an energy unit produces more water and less CO2.
3That trends are upward-sloping does not, of course, contradict the ”Inverted U” hypothesis. What is
new here is that our approach puts little weight on the emission peaks of the 1970s which are necessarily
important for reduced-form estimations using postwar or shorter data. We find more evidence for structural
breaks occurring early and potentially relating to shifts from solid (coal) to liquid (oil) fuels than for breaks
occurring late and relating to shifts permanently away from oil.
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Our testing procedures follow the general theme of the literature started by Nelson and
Plosser [18] in that we identify stable trends in CO2 series which emissions tend to revert
to.4 In our case, the trend function has potentially multiple data-dependent (endogenous)
structural breaks, a possibility necessarily needed since the data spans over a century and
extraordinary periods such as the World Wars and oil price shocks. Getting an idea of the
time-series properties of the emissions is essential for both understanding their historical
behavior and forecasting, and, therefore, we start our analysis by unit root tests, taking the
possibility of structural breaks into account. Although we do not want to project national
emissions very far to the future without having a structural model, we do project our series
through 2028 for two reasons.5 First, forecasts provide a consistency check for the estimated
historical break-structure.6 Second, forecasts can be used to discuss whether per-capita
emissions have already peaked or if such peaks can be expected in the near future. Using
this reasoning we find that the early in-sample peaks for emissions from solid-fuels burning
for the first-movers in industrial development are the true peaks for emission from this source.
However, we find no such in-sample peaks in non-solid-fuel emissions for all but one country.
4To this end we use Dickey-Fuller type unit root tests [5], [6], allowing for the possibility of structural
breaks in trend first introduced by Perron [19] and further developed by Zivot and Andrews [29] and Vogelsang
and Perron [27] among others.
5By the nature of the climate change, only very long-term projections are of ultimate interest. For
example, the MIT-EPPA model, which is a computable general equilibrium model, is used to produce
projections through 2100 (for the EPPA model, see Babiker el al. 2001). The time series approach cannot
compete with these projections, so we focus on the historical trends and use forecasts only for the purpose
specified below.
6We will compare our projections with those published by the U.S. department of energy (doe). Our
projected total emission trends are roughly consistent with the U.S.doe projections.
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This leads us to finally rule out the oil price shocks of the 1970s as events causing permanent
changes in the overall per-capita emission trends.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and
general characteristics of CO2 series. Section 3 introduces the econometric methodology,
discusses the problems related to breakpoint selection, and explains our operational testing
procedures. Section 4 presents the empirical results for total and solid-fuel emissions. Using
the estimated models for each series, section 5 introduces the projections for total, solid-,
and non-solid-fuel emissions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Per-Capita CO2 Series 1870-1998
We use the emission data provided by the U.S. Department of Energy through its Carbon
Dioxide Information Analysis Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (CDIAC) [16]. An
observation is an annual number giving national emissions in metric tons of carbon from
fossil-fuel burning, cement manufacturing, and gas flaring. The vast majority of annual
emissions come from two sources, from solid and liquid and gaseous (non-solid) fuel uses.7
For a country i, burning of a given fuel in year t is
burningit = productionit+importsit-exportsit (1)
-bunkersit-changes in stocksit
7We will consider the total emissions and solid-fuels emissions separately. The number for non-solid-fuel
emissions is the residual and therefore will not be explicitly presented. Solid fuels include diﬀerent varieties
of coal and coke, and peat. Non-solid fuels include crude and processed oils, natural gas liquids, and natural
gas.
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which is then multiplied by fuel-specific oxidization and carbon content coeﬃcients (see
Andres et al. [1]).8 The emission data period is 1751-1998 but we work with shorter period
1870−1998 because (i) this improves the quality of the data,9 and (ii) at 1870 most of the 16
countries we consider had entered the industrial era.10 The source of the population data is
Maddison [15]. By and large, both data sets reflect the present national boundaries.11 Using
8The first three numbers on the r.h.s. of (1) are from historical energy production and fuel trade statistics.
The last two are available only for the postwar period. The omission of the last two numbers for the pre-1950
period is not a source of large errors because these numbers are significant only for the postwar period.
9We are aware of two studies addressing the quality of CDIAC numbers. First, Kunnas and Myllyntaus
[13] reconstructed the Finnish numbers using domestic statistics and found no great discrepancies (they do
find diﬀerences by changing the coverage of emissions). Second, the Swedish series was reconstructed by
Kander [12]. For the postwar period, her series is systematically at a lower level than the CDIAC series, but
both have the same pattern. This indicates potentially large errors in cumulative national emissions. This
error should not aﬀect our qualitative conclusions. In general, our hypothesis is that the pre-1950 data is
more accurate for small countries importing most of their fuels than for large countries producing from own
reserves (historical trade records are more precise than production records). If there is a systematic error
of neglecting early production, this should only reinforce our conclusions regarding early rather than late
downturns in trends.
10We excluded Norway because we suspected a data problem. We included Austria despite the huge
territorial changes due to Ausria-Hungary dual monarchy (1867-1918) since per-capita numbers remain
reasonable.
11Territorial changes require a number of adjustments. The population series for Germany was constructed
as follows. Using Maddison [15] we obtain population estimates for an area that corresponds to the 1989
borders of the Federal Republic. For 1946-1998 we added the population of the GDR territory, and for
1870-1945 we assumed that the proportion of the population in the GDR territory remained constant (38
percent). Thus, both the population and the CDIAC emission data reflect the present territory of Germany.
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these two data sets we construct the per-capital series which we transform into logarithms.12
The logarithms of national per-capita emissions are graphed in fig. 1 which makes two
points clear. First, and not surprisingly, national emissions from fossil-fuel burning at 1870
indicate the stage of industrial development. Therefore, the early levels are highest for
the U.K., Belgian, German and the U.S. series; the ranking of emissions at 1870 follows
rather closely the income-level ranking provided, for example, by Maddison [15]. The second
descriptive feature is that some early developed countries reached their current per-capita
emission levels surprisingly early, during the first decades of the 20th century. Solid-fuel uses
are responsible for the early emissions. Per-capita emissions from these sources are shown
in fig. 2 which illustrates that solid-fuel emissions have not only reached high levels early
but also potentially peaked very early. This is confirmed by Table 1 showing the historical
peaks for each series in figs. 1-2. The table shows also the peaks for the diﬀerence between
total and solid-fuels emissions representing emissions from non-solid-fuel uses.13
[Figs.1− 2]
We can now restate the question for our research more precisely. In view of fig.1, does
it seem plausible that the oil price shocks of 1970s or perhaps earlier extraordinary events
have caused permanent downturns in national per-capita emission trends? What is the exact
timing of these potential structural breaks? To answer this question we will construct time-
12The CDIAC data set includes per-capita emissions only for the period 1950-1998. To avoid inconsisten-
cies between the population estimates, our per-capita numbers for the period 1950-1998 are based on the
Maddison’s population data. We compared our per-capita numbers with those of the CDIAC and found no
significant discrepancies.
13Emissions from cement manufacturing are insignificant and can be ignored here.
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series representations for each total and solid-fuel emission series with potentially multiple
structural breaks. The representations will help to understand historical emission patterns
for these series and also for the residual, non-solid-fuel emission series. The representations
will be used in analyzing whether the historical peaks in Table 1 will be exceeded in the near
future.14
[Table 1]
3 The Econometric Methodology
The econometric problem is that of choosing between two competing models, both of which
are conceivable representations of the per-capita CO2 series, {yt}T1 , for a given individual
country. Under the null hypothesis, the series is a unit root process. Under the alternative
hypothesis, the series is stationary around a deterministic trend function. The behavior
of the series is thus very diﬀerent under the null and alternative hypotheses, and the unit
root test can be seen as a pretest for determining the significance of structural breaks. In
addition, the unit root test improves the predictive accuracy of emission projections (see, e.g.,
Diebold and Kilian [7]). Our purpose is to identify those series which can be represented by
a stationary and piecewise linear trend function where breaks are endogenously determined
by the data. To make this target entirely clear, consider fig. 3 which depicts the U.S. per-
14We emphasize that we do not have a structural explanation for the patterns we produce. Our results will
indicate interesting across-country diﬀerences which may be used later to formulate structural hypotheses.
For example, the substitution between emissions from solid and non-solid fuel uses is likely to depend on
national coal reserves, share of exports, or on national fuel composition in general.
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capita emissions and a linear trend function with three breaks. We will explain the testing
procedure in detail below, but fig. 3 illustrates the general idea: we seek to piece together
linear trend segments with data-dependent lengths. The hope is that the estimated trend
function identifies the critical phases in historical emissions development and that the trend
works well also after the data period.
[Fig.3]
3.1 Unit root testing with one break
We consider the following additive outlier (AO) model
yt = µ+ βt+ γDTt + zt, t = 1, 2, ..., T (2)
where DTt = 1(t > Tb)(t − Tb), 1 < Tb < T is the break date, and 1(·) is the indicator
function. zt is an ARMA(p + 1, q) process A(L)zt = B(L)et where et ∼ iid(0,σ2). Lag
polynomial A(L) can be factored as A(L) = (1 − αL)A∗(L) and the pth order polynomial
A∗(L) and B(L) have all roots outside the unit circle. The initial value y0 is assumed to be a
fixed constant. In unit root testing the null hypothesis can thus be expressed as H0 : α = 1
while the alternative hypothesis is H1 : |α| < 1. The magnitude of the potential trend break
is measured by parameter γ. As mentioned above, no level shifts are allowed for. There is
no particular reason to expect them and their inclusion in the model can reduce the power
of the unit root test if none really are present.
The additive outlier model implies a sudden break in contrast to the so called innovational
outlier (IO) model where the break evolves slowly over time. We prefer the AO model here
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because the main emphasis is on the potential trend break due to, for example, the oil price
shock whose eﬀect on the trend of the series can be expected to be abrupt in the annual
data we use. The lag length p also turns out to be unity in all cases so that the diﬀerence
between the two specifications is expected to be minor.15
In testing for a unit root it will be assumed that a break in trend can only occur under
the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. Hence, we are interested in finding out whether
shocks to the carbon dioxide series are permanent or whether the series can be characterized
as having temporary shocks fluctuating around a broken deterministic trend function. This
assumption could, of course, be tested using a test for a break that is valid under both
hypotheses, but such a pretest is likely to distort the size of the actual unit root test, and
therefore, we have not taken this route.16
For a given known break date we could use the two-step procedure of Perron[19]. First,
the series yt is detrended by running the following OLS regression
yt = µ+ βt+ γDTt + eyt.
Then, the unit root test statistic is obtained as the t statistic testing for α = 1, tbα, in the
15The finite sample simulations of Vogelsang and Perron (1998) suggested that if the magnitude of the
shift is suspected to be large (here we expect the slope of the trend to turn from positive to negative), the
AO model is preferable to the IO model in terms of the size of the unit root test. Also, it can be shown that
the correct break date is estimated asymptotically correctly using the procedure we employ below in the AO
model (2) but not in the corresponding IO model (see, Vogelsang and Perron (1998)).
16We experimented with one such test, namely the Sup WD1T test of Vogelsang (1997), as a preliminary
check for a significant break, and it indicated no evidence for breaks in any of the series. However, for
persistent but stationary series the test is conservative and may not be very powerful.
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regression
eyt = αeyt−1 + kX
i=1
ci∆eyt−i + ut.
However, for CO2 series it is diﬃcult to ascertain what exact event is a reasonable breakpoint,
so we cannot assume knowledge of the break date. Also, estimating this date is of interest
in its own right. Several break date estimators in a model like (2) have been introduced.
Because we expect the break to be such that it turns the deterministic trend from positive to
negative, the natural estimator is based on minimizing tγ, the t statistic of γ over all possible
break dates. This estimator selects the date corresponding to the most negative value of tγ,
thus maximizing the probability of a turn in the trend. Vogelsang and Perron [27] have shown
that in our setup this estimator selects the correct break date asymptotically, contrary to
some other popular estimators such as the one based on minimizing tα. The asymptotic null
distribution of the test statistic is derived by Vogelsang and Perron [27] who also tabulate
some critical values.
3.2 Unit root testing with multiple breaks
Above we described the case of one potential break in the deterministic trend. In practice it
is likely that multiple such breaks have occurred. However, directly extending the framework
to the case of an unknown number of breaks at unknown dates is complicated, and to our
knowledge, such tests have not been presented.17 To tackle with the problem of multiple
breaks we employ the following sequential procedure. Model (2) is first estimated with data
from the entire sample period to obtain the estimate for the break date Tb and the unit root
17Lumsdaine and Papell [14] introduced unit root tests in the case where the number of structural breaks
is known to be two, but they only explicitly considered models including level shifts as well.
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test statistic. If the break is estimated relatively early in the sample, a new search over the
period from Tb + 1 until the end of the sample is conducted to obtain another break date
Tb and unit root test statistic for this subsample period. This may be repeated if the new
break date lies near Tb so that enough observations are available to still expect reasonable
power in the unit root test.
The series is deemed stationary if the unit root test rejects (at the 10% level) in the
entire sample because in this case the test is most powerful and expected to reject even if
additional breaks were introduced. On the other hand, if only one break near the end of the
sample period is detected and the unit root test fails to reject, the series can rather safely
be deemed a unit root process. It turns out that in addition to these two clear cases, there
are some series for which the unit root null is not rejected in any of the subsample periods.
These cases are problematic because it is possible that a unit root test simultaneously taking
multiple breaks into account, would reject the unit root hypothesis. Nevertheless, in these
cases we shall conclude that the series is a unit root process.
Having estimated all the breaks, we estimated for each stationary series an AO model
for testing the significance of the breaks (if any) and for forecasting. In specifying the model
we started out by estimating an AO model including all the estimated breaks and tested
the significance of each of them individually using a t-test. If some of the breaks were not
individually significant (at the 10% level), the least significant break was dropped and the
model was reestimated. This procedure was then repeated until all the included breaks were
significant. The ensuing model was used for forecasting, while the forecasts for the I(1)
series were computed from autoregressive models estimated for the diﬀerence.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Total Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Uses
The main empirical result is that we find no general evidence for structural breaks causing
downward-sloping per-capita emissions during or after the oil-price shocks of the 1970s. We
find clear evidence for such late breaks only for the U.K. and Sweden and some evidence for
Belgium and Denmark. All the remaining structural breaks in stable trends are very early
downturns in the (positive) slope of the trend: Austria 1907, Denmark 1904, Germany 1900,
U.K. 1901, U.S. 1908. A stable trend function without breaks can be found for Finland,
Italy, and the Netherlands.18
[Table 2]
To see how these conclusions were reached, consider table 2 which presents the unit
root tests and estimated break dates for the total emission series. The table shows all the
estimated breaks but only breaks in stationary series are relevant.19 The series for the 10
countries mentioned above are stationary.20 However, not all of the breaks in the stationary
18Since we generally reject structural breaks related to the oil price shocks, it should be emphasized that
our sequential method is not unfair to breaks occurring late in the series. First, a break in the 70s has
a chance to be chosen in each consecutive estimation. Second, serious loss of power is not expected in
subsample tests either because only relatively large subsamples are considered.
19Under the null hypothesis, a large shock is a realization from the tail of the distribution for the data-
generating process.
20For these 10 countries, the unit root hypothesis is rejected in the entire sample at the 10% significance
level. For the French series the break point is estimated near the end of the series and the test does not
reject, so that the series can relatively safely be concluded to be I(1). Hence we are left with five somewhat
problematic series (namely those of Austria, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland) for which the
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series are statistically significant. This was to be expected because our procedure assumes
that in each subsample period there is one break but there is no reason for this assumption
to be true. Their individual significance was tested in an AO model as described above.21
It turns out that the series of Finland, Italy and the Netherlands have no significant breaks,
whereas those of Denmark and the UK have two and the rest one significant trend break.
An interesting question relating to the significant breaks is whether they indicate a turn in
the trend from upward to downward sloping. This can be examined by computing confidence
intervals for the sum of the coeﬃcient of the linear trend and the trend break dummies.
Such 90% confidence intervals are presented in Table 4. If the confidence interval includes
only negative values, there is strong evidence for a downturn causing a downward sloping
trend. With the exception of the U.K. series, negative values are included only in the
confidence intervals corresponding to breaks occurring in the 70s which points towards the
oil price shocks. However, there is strong evidence for a downward sloping trends only for the
U.K. and Sweden as these are the two countries with confidence intervals containing purely
negative values corresponding to the 1974 break for the UK and the 1976 break for Sweden.
In contrast, the results indicate no turn in the trend of the series of Australia, Germany and
the USA.
[Table4]
unit root null cannot be rejected in any of the subsample periods, but as discussed above, they will be
classified as I(1).
21Under stationarity, standard asymptotic theory should apply, and hence, the t-statistics are compared
to critical values from the standard normal distribution.
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4.2 Emissions from Solid-Fuel Uses
The results for the solid-fuel series are presented in Tables 3 and 5. The main result is that
most breaks occur relatively early and that there are much stronger early changes in the
slopes of the stable trends than in the case of the total emissions series. The lack of general
evidence for late breaks in total and solid-fuel emissions suggests that there is no general
evidence oil-price shock related break for the diﬀerence of the two series neither, e.g., for the
emissions from liquid and gaseous fuel uses.22
Using the same method as above, the clearly stationary solid-fuel series are those of
Australia, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK,
while the rest are deemed unit-root processes. The following countries experience downturns
twice and clearly have downward sloping post-break(s) trends: Germany (1909, 1987), New
Zealand (1899, 1947), and the U.K. (1955, 1993). Belgium (1937) and Sweden (1911) both
have one clear structural break and a negative post-break trend. Thus, for these five countries
we can rather safely conclude that the decline of emissions from solid-fuel uses has started
early. For Italy the break occurs early, in 1904, but it merely flattens the trend; there is
no evidence for either downward or upward sloping post-break trends. For Australia (1908),
Japan (1976), and Finland (no break) the trend remains upward-sloping throughout the
sample period. Thus, for these four countries there is no evidence for a decline of solid-fuel
emissions.
[Tables 3 and 5]
22We do not analyze the series for emissions from non-solid fuels directly, because in most cases the series
are too short for our method.
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5 Forecasts
We project the national per-capita series through 2028 for two reasons.23 First, the forecasts
depend on the historical break structure estimated above, meaning that by comparing the
forecasts with those published elsewhere we obtain a rough consistency check on the esti-
mated break structure. Second, forecast can be used to discuss whether the historical peaks
in Table 1 will remain as peaks or if the true peaks can be expected in the near future.
[Table 6]
Table 6 shows our estimates for per-capita emission peaks over the period 1870− 2028.
In view of the Table 6 and the fact that the post-break trends are downward sloping, we
can rather safely conclude that total per-capita emissions have in-sample peaks for Sweden
(1970) and the U.K. (1913). Note, however, that despite of the overall decline, non-solid-
fuel emissions are expected to have a peak relatively late (2015) in the U.K. Our forecasts
suggest that also Austria, Belgium and Denmark have in-sample peaks for the total per-
capita emissions.24 The historical emission peaks for the remaining 14 countries will be
exceeded in the near future, according to our analysis. In contrast, for most countries, solid-
23Forecasts for both the ”total” and ”solid” series were computed either from autoregressions for the
diﬀerence or stationary AO models, depending on whether the series was deemed I(1) or I(0). For those I(0)
series in which no significant breaks were detected, the model, of course, reduces to a regular autoregression.
The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) selected one lag in each case. The stationary AO models were
formulated sequentially by dropping the insignificant breaks one at a time, as described above (see, p. 13).
In other words, these models include the breaks in Tables 3 and 5 that are significant at the 10% level at
least.
24However, the post-break trend for Austria and Denmark is positive, so the conclusion depends on the
length of the projection period.
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fuel emissions have early peaks in the sample, implying that it is the non-solid fuel use that
is driving the total. The group of countries with early peaks includes all of the first-movers
in industrialization.
Figures 4-5 show the total per-capita emissions, our projections of these series through
2028, and the forecasts published by the U.S.d.o.e. [8] (dots at years 1998, 1999, 2005, 2010,
2015, 2020) for 6 countries. The two sets of projections do not exactly coincide but are
reasonably consistent with each other.25
[Figs. 4-5]
6 Conclusion
One of the most pressing global climate policy issues is the future development of greenhouse
gas emissions. Even the most intelligent emission forecasts have to be based on historical
emission patterns. The history, which is extended to the future by projection-models, typ-
ically covers the period after the Second World War. However, the history of economic
development based on the carbon-intensive energy use is considerably longer than the post-
war period: for some early industrialized countries, historical per-capita emissions peaked
already before the history of a typical projection-model started. In this paper we attempted
to understand the basic trends in the development of carbon-intensive energy use, with a
long historical perspective.
To the above end, we addressed the properties of the historical time series for per-capita
25The U.S.doe forecasts are available also for Japan and the Netherlands. We excluded the comparisons
with these two countries because the 1998 levels of the series are diﬀerent in the two data sets.
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CO2 emissions in major developed countries. We used econometric approach to find ”stable
phases” for per-capita emission development. We found evidence for a two-phase pattern:
the initial fast growth during the early industrialization followed by an early downturn to
a period of less growth in per-capita emissions. Only for two countries could we find clear
evidence about a third phase characterized by declining per-capita emissions. A similar
two-phase pattern applies for emissions from solid-fuel burning, for most early industrialized
countries, with the diﬀerence that emissions from this source seem be on a declining path.
The results imply that emissions from liquid and gaseous fuels are mainly responsible for
the historical and future growth in emissions; the oil price shocks of the 1970s did not cause
general downturns in long-run trends for these emissions. The estimated two-phase pattern
for per-capita emissions can be seen as partial ”decarbonization” of per-capita energy use.
The process has been important in slowing down the rate of increase in emissions, but there
is little historical evidence that it could reduce future per-capital emissions.
While the finding that many of the per-capita emission series are nonstationary may
seem confusing, it should be noted that the result does not rule out an equilibrium relation-
ship between CO2 emissions and economic variables. It is quite possible that there exists a
reduced-form long-run relationship between the levels of emissions and income per capita,
as assumed by the literature on the ”Inverse U”. For nonstationary series the existence of
such a relationship would mean cointegration [9]. The present analysis is a first step toward
cointegration analysis, because a long-run relationship between these variables makes sense
only if their time-series properties are known to be similar (the series must be integrated
of the same order). However, given that most of the emission series were deemed station-
ary, cointegration is not meaningful for them, and alternative long-run equilibrium concepts
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should be entertained. One possibility would be to consider nonlinear models and test for
common nonlinearities (see, e.g. Bierens [4]). Our results about diﬀerences in the proper-
ties of national CO2 series indicate potential diﬀerences for the nature of national long-run
relationships across countries.
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Figure 1: Logarithm of ”per-capita CO2” from fossil fuel burning over 1870-1998 for Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Sweden,Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
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Figure 2: Logarithm of ”per-capita CO2” from solid fuel burning over 1870-1998 for Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
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Figure 3: Logarithm of ”per-capita CO2” over 1870-1998 for the United States. The broken
trend line is fitted OLS with breaks at 1908 and 1978.
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Figure 4: Logarithms of per-capita CO2 over 1870-1998 and projections through 2028 for
Japan, the U.K., and U.S. The U.S. d.o.e. forecasts are dots at 1998, 1999, 2005, 2010, 2015,
and 2020.
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Figure 5: Logarithms of per-capita CO2 over 1870-1998 and projections through 2028 for
Japan, the U.K., and U.S. The U.S. d.o.e. forecasts are dots at 1998, 1999, 2005, 2010, 2015,
and 2020.
27
Table 1: Peak Years for Total, Solid, and Non-Solid Fuel CO2 Emissions over 1870-1998.
Country Total Solid Fuels Non-Solid Fuels
Australia 1998 1998 1996
Austria 1908 1908 1998
Belgium 1973 1929 1974
Canada 1948 1918 1979
Denmark 1991 1996 1996
Finland 1996 1996 1976
France 1973 1930 1973
Germany 1979 1959 1979
Italy 1998 1985 1998
Japan 1996 1997 1996
Netherlands 1979 1931 1997
New Zealand 1997 1910 1979
Sweden 1970 1937 1973
Switzerland 1973 1939 1985
UK 1913 1913 1996
US 1973 1918 1973
28
Table 2: Unit root tests for the total emissions series.
tbα Tb tbα Tb tbα Tb
Australia —3.99 [0.062] 1907∗∗ —2.68 [0.492] 1989
Austria —2.99 [0.359] 1880 —2.62 [0.515] 1889 —2.53 [0.558] 1995
Belgium —3.97 [<0.01] 1977+
Canada —3.72 [0.110] 1906 —3.21 [0.265] 1981
Denmark —4.01 [0.059] 1904∗∗ —4.30 [0.030] 1978∗∗
Finland —3.85 [0.085] 1980
France —3.38 [0.204] 1978
Germany —5.10 [<0.01] 1900∗∗ —4.53 [0.017] 1987
Italy —3.97 [0.065] 1883 —3.80 [0.097] 1995
Japan —1.98 [0.782] 1902 —1.60 [0.894] 1992
Netherlands —4.44 [0.020] 1883 —4.21 [0.038] 1979
New Zealand —1.77 [0.851] 1897 —1.57 [0.900] 1904 —2.33 [0.644] 1995
Sweden —4.41 [0.023] 1976∗∗
Switzerland —3.64 [0.131] 1897 —3.19 [0.272] 1990
UK —7.38 [<0.01] 1901∗∗ —7.00 [<0.01] 1974∗∗
USA —4.52 [0.017] 1908∗∗ —3.43 [0.189] 1978
Marginal significance levels, computed using the pval program by Timothy J. Vogelsang, in
brackets. The lag length k was selected by the BIC criterion. ∗∗, ∗ and + denote significance at
the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Unit root tests for the solid-fuel series.
tbα Tb tbα Tb tbα Tb
Australia —3.87 [0.083] 1908∗∗ —2.56 [0.544] 1915 —2.54 [0.549] 1995
Austria —3.48 [0.172] 1899 —2.83 [0.429] 1991
Belgium —4.13 [0.046] 1937∗∗ —3.46 [0.179] 1954 —2.48 [0.577] 1995
Canada —2.76 [0.457] 1911 —1.64 [0.884] 1918 —1.41 [0.928] 1942
—1.55 [0.903] 1995
Denmark —3.12 [0.305] 1912 —2.50 [0.569] 1930 —2.04 [0.760] 1937
—1.94 [0.795] 1995
Finland —4.37 [0.025] 1952 —3.49 [0.170] 1995
France —3.56 [0.150] 1954 —3.03 [0.341] 1982
Germany —5.05 [<0.01] 1909∗∗ —4.84 [<0.01] 1987∗∗
Italy —6.27 [<0.01] 1904∗∗ —5.54 [<0.01] 1911 —5.41 [<0.01] 1995
Japan —4.65 [0.012] 1896 —4.45 [0.020] 1914∗∗ —4.13 [0.046] 1921
—3.98 [0.063] 1995
Netherlands —2.54 [0.551] 1931 —1.32 [0.941] 1950 —0.85 [0.978] 1957
—1.29 [0.944] 1995
New Zealand —3.96 [0.066] 1899∗∗ —2.87 [0.409] 1947∗ —2.32 [0.646] 1954
—2.58 [0.531] 1987
Sweden —4.06 [0.054] 1911∗∗ —3.55 [0.152] 1934 —2.99 [0.358] 1995
Switzerland —3.18 [0.277] 1932 —2.51 [0.564] 1956 —1.56 [0.901] 1995
UK —6.54 [<0.01] 1955∗∗ —3.59 [0.143] 1993+
USA —2.80 [0.441] 1908 —2.06 [0.753] 1915 —2.38 [0.621] 1995
See notes to Table 2.
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Table 4: 90% confidence intervals for the linear trend after the significant break points for
the total emissions series.
Tb
Australia 1907 0.0162, 0.02059
Belgium 1977 —0.0243, 0.0040
Denmark 1904 0.0195, 0.0237
1978 —0.0076, 0.0042
Germany 1900 0.0027, 0.0079
Sweden 1976 —0.0497, —0.0066
UK 1901 —0.0005, 0.0012
1974 —0.0089, —0.0038
USA 1908 0.0040, 0.0069
90% confidence intervals for the sum of the
coeﬃcient of the linear trend and the trend
break dummies up to Tb.
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Table 5: 90% Confidence intervals for the linear trend after the significant break points for
the solid-fuel series.
Tb
Australia 1908 0.0081, 0.0126
Belgium 1937 —0.0218, —0.0133
Germany 1909 —0.0049, 0.0003
1987 —0.0634, —0.0591
Italy 1904 —0.0028, 0.0075
Japan 1976 0.0019, 0.0156
New Zealand 1899 —0.0123, —0.0054
1947 —0.0281, —0.0074
Sweden 1911 —0.0075, —0.0071
UK 1955 —0.1295, —0.0237
1993 —0.1195, —0.0127
90% confidence intervals for the sum of the
coeﬃcient of the linear trend and the trend
break dummies up to Tb.
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Table 6: Peak Years for Total, Solid, and Non-Solid Series over 1870-2028.
Peak Year
Total Solid Non-Solid
Australia 2028 2028 2028
Austria 1908 1908 2028
Belgium 1973 1929 1974
Canada 2028 1918 2028
Denmark 1996 2028 1996
Finland 2028 2028 2028
France 2028 1930 2028
Germany 2028 1959 2028
Italy 2028 2028 2028
Japan 2028 2028 2028
Netherlands 2028 1931 2028
New Zealand 2028 1910 2028
Sweden 1970 1937 1973
Switzerland 2028 2028 2028
UK 1913 1913 2015
USA 2028 1918 2028
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